Project & Development
Ransomware Recovery Plan: Agree on RPO and RTO, Verify a Pre-Intrusion Restore Point, Set the Order
Advanced | 4 whiteboard pages · Task board: 4 columns (4 parent tasks, 12 subtasks)
Advanced: Assumes you know the technical terms and methods, and the steps are only outlined. Work through it on your own, guided by decision criteria and points to check.
Agree with the business the RPO (data point to restore) and RTO (hours to restore) for each system, and the ransomware recovery order from identity systems to work PCs. Assuming a breach, rank the operations that cannot stop in a business impact analysis (BIA) table and split decisions across business units, executives, and IT with vendors. Review backups on four points (immutability, a separate admin login, storage off the normal network, a pre-intrusion restore point) plus scope. Post-intrusion backups may hold rogue accounts, so choose one only after a forensic vendor dates the breach, and test in isolation first. Four traps (backups encrypted too, a console open to everyday admins, a second outage, a runbook only on servers) each get what happens, how to check, and the fix. In Japan, the IPA ransomware handbook for executives (September 2026) also helps; check the latest edition. The whiteboard has four pages; the task board has 4 columns, 4 parent tasks, and 12 subtasks.
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Ransomware Recovery Plan Board
How to use (4 pages): ① Page 1, list backups, put RPO and RTO in a table, pick who agrees (boards①–⑤) → ② Page 2, tabulate the protection setup, check the traps (boards⑥–⑨) → ③ Page 3, rank weak spots by impact and effort, set fixes and dates (boards⑩–⑪) → ④ Page 4, set restore order and drills, make a paper runbook (boards⑫–⑭)
1/4 Agree the restore targets
① Purpose and assumptions (start here)
- Purpose e.g. Be able to resume orders and shipping within 2 days even after a breach
- Current backups e.g. Core system and file share backed up nightly, 7 generations, stored on one on-site NAS
- Assumptions and scope e.g. Assume you must restore without the everyday admin accounts. Scope is the four systems in ②
② Business impact analysis (BIA): RPO and RTO per system
| Operations that cannot stop | Target time to restore (RTO) | Data point to restore (RPO) | Restore priority | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identity infrastructure | e.g. Login and email for everyone | e.g. 8 hours | e.g. Previous night | e.g. 1 (the basis for everything else) |
| Core system | e.g. Ordering, shipping, billing | e.g. 24 hours | e.g. Previous night; re-enter same-day orders from paper slips | e.g. 2 |
| File share | e.g. Shared drawings and quotes | e.g. 3 days | e.g. Up to 2 days old is acceptable | e.g. 3 |
| Work PCs | e.g. Staff's daily work | e.g. 5 days, department by department | e.g. Not restored; wipe and reinstall | e.g. 4 |
③ Business units (decide RPO and RTO)
- e.g. The sales head agrees to a 24-hour RTO for orders
- e.g. Decide who re-enters same-day orders
- Owner: ____ / Date agreed: ____
④ Executives (cost and restart decision)
- e.g. Set a spending cap for the isolated storage
- e.g. Name one person who declares operations resumed
- Owner: ____ / Date agreed: ____
⑤ IT and vendors (answer whether it can be done)
- e.g. The vendor answers with a time estimate whether the RTOs in ② can be met
- e.g. Set a contact who is reachable at night and on holidays
- Owner: ____ / Date agreed: ____
2/4 Design the protection
⑥ Backup protection setup (apply to the four systems in ②)
| Current state | Target state | How to check | Owner | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scope covered | e.g. Core system and file share only | e.g. All four in ②, including the identity infrastructure settings | e.g. Compare the target list in the backup settings with ② | e.g. IT |
| Immutable setting | e.g. Not set | e.g. Make it impossible to delete or rewrite during the retention period | e.g. Check the retention setting and period in the storage console | e.g. Vendor |
| Console authentication | e.g. Opens with everyday domain admins | e.g. Dedicated account separate from the normal identity system, plus an authenticator app or passkey | e.g. Check the console login method and the account list | e.g. IT |
| Isolated storage | e.g. Only a NAS on the same network | e.g. Keep one more copy in storage the normal network cannot reach | e.g. Confirm the route to the storage on the network diagram | e.g. Vendor |
| Pre-intrusion point | e.g. Latest 7 generations only | e.g. Keep by days, not generation count; allow for the days until you notice an intrusion and keep older monthly generations too | e.g. Check the generation list and write how many days back you can go | e.g. IT |
⑦ Trap: backups get encrypted too
- What happens, e.g. the storage sits in the same place as the everyday file share, gets encrypted with production, and cannot be restored
- How to check, e.g. see whether the "Immutable setting" and "Isolated storage" rows of ⑥ are met by the current state
- Countermeasure, e.g. do not join the backup server to the everyday domain (or split it into its own management; confirm with the product guide and the vendor), and block writes from the production file share to the storage
- Check result, e.g. applies; move to ⑩
⑧ Trap: the console relies on everyday authentication
- What happens, e.g. if an everyday admin account is hijacked, the attacker also enters the backup console and deletes generations
- How to check, e.g. besides the "Console authentication" row in ⑥, check on the settings screen whether one admin alone can delete generations
- Countermeasure, e.g. require another person's approval or a waiting period to delete generations or change retention. If the product cannot, ask the vendor for an alternative
- Check result, e.g. applies; move to ⑩
⑨ Trap: down again after restoring
- What happens, e.g. you restore a generation taken after the intrusion, rogue accounts included, and operations stop again days later
- How to check, e.g. ask the forensic vendor when the intrusion began and pick an earlier generation; after restoring, list admin accounts and scheduled-task settings in the isolated place
- Countermeasure, e.g. replace the passwords and keys of the identity infrastructure before connecting to the business network
- Check result, e.g. no forensic vendor chosen yet; move to ⑩
3/4 Fix the weak spots
⑩ Line up the weak spots from ⑥ to ⑨ (impact × effort)
Vertical axis: Impact on recovery (small → large) / Horizontal axis: Effort of the fix (low → high)
- Fix now (high impact, low effort) e.g. Move the backup console to a dedicated account with multi-factor authentication (authenticator app or passkey) (⑧)
- Plan and fix (high impact, high effort) e.g. Set up storage cut off from the normal network (⑦; agree the cost with ④)
- Fix along the way (low impact, low effort) e.g. Align the backup target list with the table in ② (⑥)
- Record and defer (low impact, high effort) e.g. Backing up every PC. Replace it with a wipe-and-reinstall policy
⑪ Weak spots, fixes, and deadlines (start with the top two quadrants of ⑩)
| Weak spot | Fix | Deadline and owner | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Priority 1 | e.g. The console opens with everyday admins | e.g. Dedicated account plus authenticator app or passkey | e.g. Week 1, IT |
| Priority 2 | e.g. Only 7 days of generations kept | e.g. Keep monthly generations older than the RPO in ② | e.g. Month 1, vendor |
| Priority 3 | e.g. No vendor chosen to date the intrusion (⑨) | e.g. Choose a forensic vendor and write night and holiday contacts in ⑤ | e.g. Month 2, IT |
| Priority 4 | e.g. Storage only on the same network | e.g. Add storage with an immutable setting | e.g. Month 3, vendor (after cost approval in ④) |
4/4 Rehearse the recovery
⑫ Restore order (based on the priorities in ② and the fixes in ⑪)
- Isolate a restore site Prepare a place not connected to the infected environment e.g. Set up an isolated verification network and tell the owner in ④ you are starting
- Identity infrastructure Recreate admin accounts and replace passwords and keys e.g. Restore from a pre-intrusion generation and check the admin list for unknown names
- Network Restore communication rules as recorded in the register e.g. Compare the openings to the outside with the register and keep unneeded ones closed
- Core system Restore in the priority order of ② and check the data point e.g. Restore orders from the previous night and have the business compare them with the last slip
- Work PCs Do not restore from backup; wipe and reinstall e.g. Hand them out department by department and record the count in the register
- Resume operations The business units check and declare the restart e.g. Check recovery within the RTO in ② and add the time taken and snags to the table in ⑪
⑬ Drill plan (to check the order in ⑫)
| How to run | What to check | Timing and owner | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tabletop walkthrough | e.g. Use only the paper runbook in ⑭ and read it through with those involved | e.g. Whether the contacts in ③ to ⑤ and who decides are clear from paper alone | e.g. Month 1, IT and business units |
| Restore one system | e.g. Restore one generation of the core system in the isolated place | e.g. Whether it is back within the RTO in ② and the data point meets the RPO | e.g. Month 2, vendor |
| Run the whole order | e.g. Run the six steps of ⑫ in order in the isolated place | e.g. Whether any step cannot proceed until the previous one finishes | e.g. Every six months, IT |
| Fix from results | e.g. Add the time taken and snags to the table in ⑪ | e.g. Outdated parts of the runbook and changed contacts | e.g. The week after the drill, runbook owner |
⑭ Trap: recovery steps not kept on paper (paper runbook)
- What happens e.g. The runbook is in the file share, gets encrypted, and cannot be read in the middle of the incident
- How to check e.g. In the tabletop walkthrough in ⑬, see whether you can start step 1 of ⑫ using paper only, without a computer
- Countermeasure (what to write on paper) e.g. Print the order in ⑫, the contacts in ③ to ⑤, and the location of the backup console, and keep them in two places
Task board contents
Not started 16 items
Agree the targets
On page 1, write down the current backups, put RPO and RTO in the BIA table, and get agreement from business units, executives, and IT with vendors. The numbers set here are the baseline for the setup and the order on the later pages. Press Ctrl+F (⌘F on Mac) and enter "3/4" to jump to page 3.
List your backups
Open the backup console (or the report from the vendor if outsourced) and copy the systems covered, the number of generations kept, and the storage location onto the "Current backups" note of board ①. It takes about 15 minutes and gives board ② its RPO baseline.
Fill the BIA table
In board ②, write for each of the four systems the operation that cannot stop, the target time to restore (RTO), the data point to restore to (RPO), and the restore priority. Done when no cell is empty.
Name who agrees
In boards ③ to ⑤, write what business units, executives, and IT with vendors each decide, plus a named owner, and get agreement on the numbers in board ②. Done when the agreement date is on a note.
Map the protection
On page 2, apply the backup protection setup to the systems in board ② as a table and check the three traps. The traps that apply decide what to fix first on page 3.
Fill in the table
In each of the five rows of board ⑥, write the current state, target state, how to check, and owner. For how to check, say whether you use the console, a diagram, or a question to the vendor.
Check traps ⑦ and ⑧
Check the traps in boards ⑦ and ⑧ against the table in ⑥ and the settings screens, and write on the "Check result" note whether each applies.
Check reinfection
In board ⑨, write who confirms the intrusion date and what you will list after restoring, then the check result. If no forensic vendor is chosen yet, record that as a weak spot too.
Fix the weak spots
On page 3, rank the weak spots found on page 2 by impact and effort, then set the fix, deadline, and owner. Fixes that cost money need executive approval, so raise them early here.
Plot weak spots
In board ⑩, place the weak spots that applied in ⑥ to ⑨ as notes and sort them into the four quadrants by impact and effort.
Set fixes and dates
In the table of board ⑪, write the weak spot, fix, deadline, and owner in priority order. Write deadlines like "week 1" or "month 3". Done when the four rows are filled.
Get cost approved
Show the costly rows of board ⑪ to the executive owner in board ④ and get approval. Done when the approval date and spending cap are on a note.
Practice recovery
On page 4, set the restore order from identity infrastructure to work PCs, plan the drills, and make a paper runbook. Move items confirmed in a drill to the "Confirmed in a drill" column of the task board.
Set restore order
In the six steps of board ⑫, write the work and what to check at each. If it differs from the priorities in ②, decide with the business which one to follow.
Plan the drills
In the table of board ⑬, write how to run each of the four drills, what to check, and the timing and owner, then schedule the first drill.
Make paper runbook
Check the trap in board ⑭, print the order from ⑫ and the contacts from ③ to ⑤ on paper, and keep it in the two places you chose. Done when the places are on a note.